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THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
LYNDA W. POWELL 
INTRODUCTION 
Do campaign donors gain disproportionate influence in the 
legislative process? Perhaps surprisingly, political scientists have 
struggled to answer this question. Much of the research has not 
identified an effect of contributions on policy; some political scientists 
have concluded that money does not matter; and this bottom line has 
been picked up by reporters and public intellectuals.1 It is essential to 
answer this question correctly because the result is of great normative 
importance in a democracy. 
It is important to understand why so many studies find no causal 
link between contributions and policy outcomes. The vast majority of 
these studies have looked at the relationship between Political Action 
Committee (PAC) donations to legislators and the roll call votes these 
legislators cast. It is relatively easy to identify a set of votes that PAC 
donors care about and thus determine whether legislators’ votes are 
aligned with the interests of their PAC donors. It is, however, much 
more difficult, as I will discuss, to determine the extent to which 
contributions influence member’s voting decisions. More importantly, 
as many of us have observed,2 the influence of contributions is most 
likely to occur earlier in the legislative process, where less visible 
actions are taken to kill bills quietly or to negotiate the details of 
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 1.  See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Unleashing the Campaign Contributions of Corporations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at B1; George Will, This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC 
television broadcast Nov. 27, 2005). 
 2.  See, e.g., LYNDA W. POWELL, THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN 
STATE LEGISLATURES (2012); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2011); Richard L. Hasen, 
Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012); Richard L. Hall & 
Frank Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional 
Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797 (1990).  
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legislation that can matter so greatly to donors. 
Studying these subtler forms of influence is difficult. Although 
there are illuminating and valuable anecdotal descriptions, systematic 
research is much less common.3 There are two basic approaches—
observational case studies and large-scale survey-based research. 
Each methodology has its strengths and weaknesses. My work using 
survey-based measures is novel in this field, although it is widely used 
in others. This paper focuses on what can be learned by adding 
surveys to our usual repertoire of data sources. 
Existing research on donors’ legislative influence has 
concentrated on Congress and usually on just one chamber. At best, 
such studies could determine if influence exists, and if it varies by 
policy domain or by member characteristics, such as committee 
chairmanship or constituency competitiveness. It is only relatively 
recently that readily available sources of data, such as contributions to 
candidates for state offices,4 have made it possible to do comparative 
analysis of American legislatures. Scholars are just beginning to take 
advantage of these opportunities.5 
Studying the fifty state legislatures, for example, as I did, makes it 
possible to identify the institutional design features that incentivize 
legislative fundraising and determine donors’ legislative influence.6 
State legislative chambers are similar enough in terms of their 
electoral and institutional structures, culture, politics, and campaign 
finance laws to make comparisons among them meaningful. Yet the 
differences in these chambers’ legislative institutions and campaign 
finance laws create substantial variation in the time legislators spend 
fundraising and, consequently, in the influence of donors. That is, they 
provide a “Goldilocks” data set for comparative analysis. 
 
 
 
 3.  See DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH (2007), and ELIZABETH DREW, THE 
CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1999), for excellent anecdotal discussions of the 
influence of money by journalists. 
 4.  The National Institute for the Study of Money in State Politics collects and releases 
these data for the fifty states.  
 5.  See, e.g., D. E. Apollonio & Raymond J. La Raja, Term Limits, Campaign 
Contributions, and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures, 31 Legis. Stud. Q. 259 (2006); 
Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the 
American States 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 552 (2013); Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological 
Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530 (2011).  
 6.  See generally POWELL, supra note 2. 
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I found that a small number of factors explain much of the 
variation among the chambers in both fundraising time and donor 
influence.7 For example, states with professionalized legislatures 
generally have large constituency sizes, highly paid members, and 
professional leadership structures; these features along with chamber 
size increase fundraising time and donor influence, while term limits 
and an educated electorate decrease both.8 
In addition to contributions, there are other ways to use money to 
influence legislative outcomes. Individuals who wish to influence 
public policy can, most notably, spend money on lobbying, as well as 
contribute. There is considerable debate among scholars about the 
relationship between lobbying and contributing, and the effects of 
lobbying in the policy process. My findings support the “access” view 
of lobbying in which the opportunity to lobby is largely contingent on 
campaign donations.9 If this view is correct, it shows a causal pathway 
for donor influence. It also means scholars need to examine the 
resources spent on both lobbying and donations to fully understand 
the influence of money in the legislative process. 
Finally, discussions of the legislative effects of money tend to focus 
on the narrow “particularistic” legislative goals of contributors, but 
some donors have broader ideological agendas. Studies have found a 
relationship between affluence and influence—public policies 
disproportionately favor the preferences of wealthier constituents 
over those of others.10 Wealthy individuals have high rates of all types 
of political participation, but it is the large amounts of money wealthy 
individuals donate that most set them apart from other citizens.11 
Disparities in political contributions have been hypothesized to 
explain wealth-related representational distortion, but we are just 
beginning to find evidence suggestive of a causal role for campaign 
contributions in representational inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 7.  Id.at 207–09. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See John R. Wright, PAC Contributions, Lobbying and Representation, 51 J. POL. 713 
(1989), for a discussion of the literature on the “access” view of lobbying.  
 10.  See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 11. SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, & HENRY BRADY, VOICE AND 
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 190 (1995). 
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I.  STUDIES RELATING PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO FLOOR VOTES IN 
CONGRESS 
 Though a variety of approaches have been used to identify the 
influence of contributions in the legislative process,12 the numerous 
studies of the relationship between PAC contributions and roll call 
votes have had the most influence in shaping the debate among 
scholars, public intellectuals, and journalists. 
The frequently cited study, Why Is There So Little Money in 
Politics?13 is based on a meta-analysis of thirty-six studies of the 
relationship between PAC contributions and Congressional floor 
voting. The authors of the study, Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de 
Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder state “that only one in four studies 
from the previous literature support the popular notion that 
contributions buy legislators’ votes. . . . [W]hen one controls for 
unobserved constituent and legislator effects, there is little 
relationship between money and legislator votes.”14 
Thomas Stratmann’s meta-analysis of the same thirty-six studies 
rejected the null-hypothesis that PAC contributions had no influence 
on the vote, but noted that, “[w]hether one believes that contributions 
matter depends on whether one also believes that all of the studies 
underlying the meta-analysis properly have controlled for the 
potential simultaneous determination of contributions and votes.”15 
This is the key point at contention in determining whether or not PAC 
contributions influence floor votes. The relationship between money 
and votes is reciprocal. PACs are more likely to give to like-minded 
legislators (those who are already more likely to vote in agreement 
with their interests) and legislators’ votes in turn may be partly 
determined by contributions. Statistically modeling the effect of 
money on votes while controlling for a member’s initial voting 
propensity has proven difficult, and is likely intractable. A study that 
does not fully control for this endogeneity will overestimate the effect 
of money on votes or find an effect when none exists. The subset of 
studies that do identify an effect of money on votes are challenged for 
 
 12.  See Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on Legislative Policy, 
11 THE FORUM 339 (2013), for a survey and critique of the larger literature. 
 13.  Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, & James M. Snyder, Why Is There So 
Little Money in Politics? 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003). 
 14.  Id. at 106. 
 15.  Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics. A (Partial) Review of the Literature, 
124 PUB. CHOICE 135, 146 (2005). 
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not fully controlling for the endogeneity between contributions and 
legislative activity. 
It is this literature, presumably, that journalist and political 
commentator George Will drew on when he concluded, “[a]bundant 
political science demonstrates that money flows to views—views do 
not move toward money.”16 Journalist Eduardo Porter cited the 
Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder study along with one other17 
in his New York Times article which stated, “[b]ut, overall, there is 
little evidence that money is effective at swaying legislation or 
improving the corporate bottom line.”18 
There are, as I have argued elsewhere,19 more fundamental 
problems with this approach to studying the influence of 
contributions. Floor votes are largely shaped by party, constituency, 
and ideology.20 Thus, the set of votes that are most susceptible to 
influence are those that are relatively unimportant to a legislator’s 
constituency or party. Stacy Gordon argues that it is in a subset of 
these votes—those in which an abstention or a switch of one vote 
would flip the outcome—that legislators are most likely to repay their 
obligations to donors.21 Thus, since contributions are likely to matter 
on only a small fraction of floor votes, the effects of money will be 
modest in magnitude and difficult to identify. 
My interviews with legislators and journalists also suggest that, 
even in the instances when votes are influenced by money, the causal 
link between the two may be indirect and effectively unobservable. I 
interviewed one legislative leader who explained that leaders ask 
caucus members to vote in support of good friends of the party—
these good friends include large party donors. If a caucus member 
flips their vote due to an appeal from their party leader, and is thus 
indirectly influenced by party donors, no financial link will be 
apparent between the member’s vote and the donor. 
 
 16.  Will, supra note 1. 
 17.  Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Michiko Ueda, Did Firms Profit 
from Soft Money?, 3 ELEC. L. J. 193 (2004). See POWELL, supra note 2, at 342–45, 350–51, for a 
more extensive discussion of the mixed findings from this literature. 
 18.  Porter, supra note 1. 
 19.  POWELL, supra note 2, at 16–19, 341–42. 
 20.  The seminal works on this topic would include: JOHN E. JACKSON, CONSTITUENCIES 
AND LEADERS IN CONGRESS (1974); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING 
DECISIONS, (1989); and John E. Jackson & John W. Kingdon, Ideology, Interest Group Scores, 
and Legislative Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 805 (1992). 
 21.  STACY B GORDON, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE VOTING: A NEW 
APPROACH 13 (2005). 
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Donors, and the lobbyists who represent them, can frustrate our 
ability to make causal connections as well. One journalist told me 
about his attempt to identify the links between donors and votes.22 A 
top lobbyist in the state capital told the journalist that he knew what 
the journalist was trying to do and he would not succeed. The lobbyist 
stated that if one client wanted to affect the likelihood a bill would 
pass, he had a different client, who was uninterested in the bill, make 
targeted donations to attain the first client’s goal. Thus, the donor on 
record was not the interested party, simply a disinterested 
intermediary. While this particular subterfuge may be rare, there are 
many ways to donate that make it more difficult or impossible to 
identify a relationship between donors and roll call votes. 
However, the fundamental problem remains that donations are 
much more likely to be influential earlier in the legislative process. As 
Woodrow Wilson wrote over a century ago, Congress “legislates in its 
committee-rooms.”23 He also, according to one intellectual history, 
related this decentralized decision-making to Congress’s being 
dominated “by the hidden influence of special interests.”24 Although 
state legislatures often differ from Congress in the powers of their 
standing committees, the observation that the details of legislation are 
generally determined in committees holds in these state chambers as 
well.25 Further, standing committees typically serve as gatekeepers by 
determining which legislation reaches the floor for a vote.26 As Tom 
Loftus, former Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly stated, “[t]he 
truest thing I can say about special interest money is that it is mainly 
given to buy the status quo.”27 Thus, donors who wish to block or 
shape legislation focus their donations on members of the committees 
 
 22.  See POWELL, supra note 2, at 16–17. 
 23.  WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, A STUDY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 69 (Joshua Wilner ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 24th ed. 1981) (1885). 
 24.  RONALD J. PESTRITTO, WOODROW WILSON AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN 
LIBERALISM 16 (2005).  
 25.  Not all chambers give committees the power to “kill a bill quietly.” In North Dakota, 
every bill introduced is referred to a committee, but all bills receive a floor vote. The committee 
may recommend the bill favorably or unfavorably, and with or without amendments. See 
WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS 
AND THE STATES 191 (10th ed. 2001). 
 26.  For discussions of the gate keeping or negative agenda powers of congressional 
committees, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN 
CONGRESS 6–9 (1997); Kenneth Schepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of 
Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987). For a similar discussion about state 
legislatures see Keith E. Hamm, U. S. State Legislative Committee Decisions: Similar Results in 
Different Settings, 5 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 31 (1980). 
 27.  TOM LOFTUS, THE ART OF LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 46 (1994).  
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that oversee their legislative interests.28 
Richard L. Hall and Frank Wayman authored the classic article 
supporting the argument that we should look at the relationship 
between PAC contributions and members’ committee activities to 
observe the influence of money in the legislative process.29 Hall and 
Wayman “found solid support for the importance of moneyed 
interests in the legislative process,” which, at the time, was “[i]n 
contrast to the substantial literature on contributions and roll calls.”30 
Their innovative work studied committee participation on one bill in 
each of three Congressional House committees. They hypothesized 
that PAC contributions are “allocated in order to mobilize legislative 
support and demobilize opposition.”31 They found that these 
contributions “did buy the marginal time, energy, and legislative 
resources that committee participation requires.”32 
Hall and Wayman also illustrated the difficulty of determining 
causality. Their case-study approach measured how much each 
committee member participated in committee decisions, finding that 
donations increased participation.33 But they did not determine 
whether that participation favored the donor; nor did they ascertain 
how influential contributions were in committee decisions. Their work 
provided an important piece of evidence about the policy process, but 
did not link contributions to the bottom line—the actual policy 
outcomes. And, as in the roll call studies, questions remain about the 
adequacy of controls for endogeneity. 
II.  CONCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE 
Hall, in a more recent work with Alan Deardorff, discussed a 
range of options delineating how contributions translate into 
influence.34 They contrasted the “buying time” version of exchange 
theory articulated by Hall and Wayman with an indirect model in 
 
 28.  See, e.g., Kevin B. Grier & Michael C. Munger, Committee Assignments, Constituent 
Preferences, and Campaign Contributions, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 24, 38 (1991) (finding that 
“legislators on a committee with legislative and regulatory jurisdiction over an interest group 
possess an institutional asset, the return to which is disproportionate contributions from that 
interest group”).  
 29.  Hall & Wayman, supra note 2, at 797. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 800. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. at 809–10. 
 34.  Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 69 (2006). 
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which PAC contributions either signal that the legislator has similar 
aims as the PAC or, more strongly, the contributions buy “access.”35 
However, “the access” is not viewed as an “opportunity to request 
favors,” but as an “offer to help on a matter that the legislators care 
about.”36 This latter view is consistent with the argument that it is the 
process that is corrupt, not the politician. Groups with greater 
resources affect the prioritization of issues, thereby producing 
unequal representation, while representatives simply accept funding 
to subsidize work on issues they believe in. 
Senator John McCain made a somewhat different argument about 
process when he argued that Congress is corrupt.37 Senator Mitch 
McConnell challenged McCain to identify the corrupt members, 
arguing that if there was corruption, it must be traceable to 
individually corrupt members. McCain instead answered that the 
corruption was systemic: 
I have personally experienced the pull from campaign staff 
alerting me to a call from a large donor. I do not believe that any 
of us privileged enough to serve in this body would ever 
automatically do the bidding of those who give. I do not believe 
that contributions are corrupting in that manner. But I do believe 
they buy access. I do believe they distort the system. And I do 
believe, as I noted, that all of us, including myself, have been 
affected by this system.38 
McCain’s view suggests that money does not just subsidize a 
member’s legislative priorities, but has a psychological “pull” as well. 
Lawrence Lessig likens the exchanges between donors and elected 
officials to a gift economy.39 Contributions create bonds that involve 
obligations. Lessig cites Senator Paul Douglas’s description of public 
corruption in which the public official is put: 
[U]nder such a feeling of personal obligation that the latter 
gradually loses his sense of mission to the public and comes to feel 
that his first loyalties are to his private benefactors and patrons. . . . 
[T]hroughout this whole process, the official will claim—and may 
indeed believe—that there is no causal connection between the 
 
 35.  Id. at 72. 
 36.  Id. at 80. 
 37.  See 145 CONG. REC. 25,410 (1999) (statement of Sen. McCain). Sen. McCain opened 
debate on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999 which he co-sponsored with Sen. Russ 
Feingold by revealing his view that Congress was systematically corrupt.  
 38.  Id. at 25,411.  
 39.  LESSIG, supra note 2, at 107–14. 
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favors he has received and the decisions which he makes.40 
Professor Glenn Parker similarly describes the symbiotic 
relationship between lobbyists and legislators.41 Although interest 
groups’ contributions do, according to Parker, serve legislators’ 
electoral goals, they also affect legislators’ priorities, encouraging 
them to specialize in the areas of interest to donors.42 Through the 
interactions established by these connections, legislators gradually 
begin to adopt the policy perspectives of their donors. 
Although quid pro quo corruption anchors one end of the 
continuum defining the influence of money in the legislative process, 
it is, as many of us argue, likely to be relatively rare.43 Instead, there 
are a range of behaviors in which the legislator, consciously or 
unconsciously, prioritizes the interests of donors over those of 
constituents. Influence occurs when a legislator acts to favor donors in 
a way he or she would not have absent contributions. Because there is 
seldom an observable one-to-one relationship between a donation 
and legislative activity that repays this obligation, it has proven 
extremely difficult, but as my work shows, not impossible, to identify 
the influence of contributions in the legislative process. 
III.  MEASURING INFLUENCE 
Survey-based measures are often used when objective measures 
are unobtainable. They are used, for example, to measure the left-
right placement of political parties in comparative politics,44 to 
estimate candidates’ liberalism-conservatism,45 and to create indices 
 
 40.  Id. at 110 (quoting Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on 
Ethical Lobbying, Campaign Contributions, Reciprocity and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 10, 15 (2008)). 
 41.  GLENN R. PARKER, CAPITOL INVESTMENTS: THE MARKETABILITY OF POLITICAL 
SKILLS 10 (2008). 
 42.  Id. at 11.  
 43.  See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. 25,410 (1999) (statement of Sen. McCain); PAUL H. 
DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 44 (1952); LESSIG, supra note 2, at 110; POWELL, supra 
note 2, at 3.  
 44.  See, e.g., KENNETH BENOIT & MICHAEL LAVER, PARTY POLITICS IN MODERN 
DEMOCRACIES (2006); Francis G. Castles & Peter Mair, Left-Right Political Scales: Some 
‘Expert’ Judgments, 12 EUR. J. RES. 73 (1984); Matthew J. Gabel & John D. Huber, Putting 
Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos 
Data, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 94 (2000); John Huber & Ronald Inglehart, Expert Interpretations of 
Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies, 1 PARTY POL. 73 (1995); Paul V. Warwick, Do 
Policy Horizons Structure the Formation of Parliamentary Governments? The Evidence from an 
Expert Survey 99 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373 (2005). 
 45.  See generally Larry M Bartels & John Zaller, Presidential Vote Models: A Recount 34 
POL. SCI. & POL. 9 (2001) (measuring liberalism-conservatism in U. S. presidential candidates). 
POWELL 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2014  4:29 PM 
84 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9:1 
of country-level corruption. Transparency International uses surveys 
to measure corruption in 177 countries; the extensive use of their 
measurements by scholars has made it possible to test and improve 
our theoretical understanding of corruption.46 
I used a similar technique to measure the influence of 
contributions in state legislatures. I asked legislators what we wish to 
determine—“To what extent is the content and passage of bills in your 
chamber influenced by the financial contributions of individuals and 
groups to candidates and parties?” This question was included in a 
national survey of 2,982 state legislators in all ninety-nine state 
legislative chambers.47 Respondents were provided a seven-point scale 
with one end labeled “Not at all influenced” and the other 
“Completely determined.”48 
It is reasonable to ask how such inevitably subjective answers to 
survey questions can measure influence. It is important to note that 
legislators are not asked about their own actions, but about the extent 
of influence in their chamber—a less threatening query. Even so, 
respondents might, for example, consistently underestimate or 
overestimate the influence of contributions. Insofar as my goal is to 
make relative comparisons between chambers, my analysis will be 
unaffected by any consistent bias. Of course, measurement error is 
always present in survey responses. However, if measurement errors 
are random, that is, unrelated to characteristics of respondents or 
their chambers, the chamber comparisons and the ultimate analytical 
results will be unbiased. Only measurement error that is not randomly 
distributed across chambers is problematic, and even non-random 
 
Survey methods are also used to measure the liberalism-conservatism of Congressional 
candidates. See Lynda W. Powell, Issue Representation in Congress 44 J. POL. 658 (1982); Lynda 
W. Powell, Analyzing Misinformation: Perceptions of Congressional Candidates’ Ideologies 34 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 272 (1989). 
 46.  See, e.g., Mitchell A. Seligson, The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A 
Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries, 64 J. POL. 408, 415 (2002) (“Most 
economists rely upon it when they examine the impact of corruption on growth and investment, 
and it is no doubt the best overall indicator of national levels of corruption worldwide.”). A 
large body of literature using the measure is widely cited. Studies based on the measure have 
been published in top journals including American Journal of Political Science, Journal of 
Politics, American Economic Review, Econometrica, British Journal of Political Science, and 
Review of Economics and Statistics.  
 47.  The survey was part of the Joint Project on Term Limits, a cooperative effort by state 
legislative scholars and the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State 
Governments, and the State Legislative Leaders Foundation. Support for the survey was 
provided in part from NSF Grant No. SES-02131. POWELL, supra note 2, app. A at 215. 
 48.  Id. app. A, at 218.  
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errors are, if identified, correctable. Drawing on existing literature, I 
controlled for five types of bias and used a Bayesian hierarchical 
model to estimate the influence of contributions in each of the ninety-
nine chambers.49 I found that chambers vary greatly in donor 
influence. My book focuses on modeling and explaining these 
chamber differences in influence. 
A. An Investment Model of Contributions 
In order to understand why chambers differ in the degree to 
which money influences policy, we need to understand the choices 
individual legislators make to raise money and accommodate donor 
interests. It is these individual decisions that ultimately determine 
how much influence campaign donations have in legislatures.  
Social scientists often use formal models to test assumptions about 
the motives that underlie these decisions. My model makes the usual 
assumptions of an investment model of campaigns, namely, that 
candidates raise money to advertise in order to increase their chances 
of election, while donors give to gain policy favors from successful 
candidates.50 The more money a candidate raises, the more she 
accommodates the policy interests of her donors in her legislative 
decisions. 
There are three important changes I make to the usual investment 
model. First, because influence depends on the actions of individual 
legislators, I begin with a model in which legislators choose how much 
time to allocate to fundraising. Second, I add the possibility that 
legislators may also fundraise, not for themselves, but for their caucus 
in order to advance their career in the chamber. Increasingly in 
Congress,51 and in some state legislatures, leadership positions and 
committee chairmanships require substantial amounts of caucus 
fundraising. Finally, I include parameters in the model to capture 
differences in political and institutional fundraising incentives so that 
the model yields predictions about how features of legislatures, such 
as legislative compensation and term limits, affect the time members 
 
 49.  Id. at 22–24.  
 50.  See, for example, Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest 
Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 90–91 (1986), in 
which the authors focus “on the implicit market for policy, in which interest groups offer 
contributions to legislators in exchange for legislators’ efforts on each interest group’s behalf.” 
They assume candidates are vote maximizers while interest groups are policy maximizers. Id. 
 51.  Eleanor Neff Powell, Where Money Matters in Congress, (2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  
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spend fundraising (for themselves and for their caucus) and 
determine chamber level influence. 
B. Empirical Analysis 
My empirical analysis serves two purposes. First, if the many quite 
varied predictions from the model are supported by empirical 
analysis, the model’s assumptions that relate fundraising to donor 
influence gain credibility, as does the validity of the survey-based 
measure of influence. The findings do fit the expectations from the 
model remarkably well. Thus, there is credible evidence that money 
has legislative influence and we can measure it. Second, the 
predictions, if accurate, can provide novel insights into how features of 
institutional design affect legislators’ fundraising decisions and 
determine the extent of donors’ legislative influence. These results can 
suggest ways to more thoughtfully design our laws and institutions to 
reduce the influence of money. 
First, the correspondence between the model predictions and the 
results is excellent. For individual legislators, the model yields twenty-
one different predictions relating personal, political, and institutional 
factors to the time the legislators running for reelection report 
devoting to fundraising for their own campaigns and for their caucus. 
Nineteen of the coefficients are in the correct direction with fifteen 
statistically significant (the two in the wrong direction are statistically 
insignificant). 
A legislator running for reelection is assumed to fundraise until 
the marginal benefits of fundraising equal the marginal costs. The 
legislator will divide her time between fundraising for her own 
campaign and the caucus so that the marginal gains of fundraising for 
self and caucus are equal. Thus, increasing the relative rate of return 
on one type of fundraising increases the time spent on that type of 
fundraising, reduces to a lesser extent the time spent on the other type 
of fundraising, and increases the total time spent on fundraising. 
Differences in legislative compensation provide an example to 
illustrate these effects. A half-century ago reformers advocated for 
higher salaries to make legislative service more desirable in order to 
attract better candidates to run for office and to increase legislative 
tenure and professionalism.52 In states where these reforms were 
 
 52. ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PROCESS, 
PARTICIPATION, AND POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 54 (1998).  
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adopted, higher salaries increased members’ reelection oriented 
activities,53 which included increased fundraising.54 I expected, and 
found, that more highly compensated legislators spend more time 
fundraising for their own campaigns, slightly less time fundraising for 
their caucuses, and, in net, slightly more time fundraising. 
Most of the hypotheses I tested explain variation within chambers 
between fundraising time for self and for caucus. For example, 
compared to members in safe seats, members in marginal 
constituencies will spend much more time fundraising for their own 
campaigns, somewhat less time fundraising for their caucuses and, in 
net, slightly more total time fundraising.55 These factors explain why 
some legislators in a chamber may be more reliant on (and 
accommodating to) donors than others. Since the ninety-nine state 
legislative chambers differ relatively little in the competitiveness of 
their legislative districts, this and similar individual-level factors that 
determine fundraising time explain little of the variation among the 
chambers in time and donor influence. 
The remaining hypotheses involve chamber-level factors, such as 
legislative compensation, that explain much of the chamber-level 
variation in fundraising time. The model posits that the more time a 
member devotes to fundraising, the more the member’s legislative 
activity is influenced by donors. Thus I expected, and found, that 
chamber-level donor influence is determined by the average time 
members in a chamber spend fundraising for themselves, the average 
time members in a chamber fundraise for their caucus, and by 
chamber size, which determines the number of members eligible to 
fundraise; these three factors explain about half the variance in donor 
influence in the ninety-nine chambers. This is an impressive amount of 
explanatory power for an analysis based on individual survey 
responses. Interestingly, the results show, as expected, that it does not 
matter whether a member devotes time to fundraising for the caucus 
or for his own campaign; the effect on influence is the same.56 
 
 
 53.  Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? Historical 
Patterns in American State Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151, 156 (2010). 
 54.  Robert E. Hogan & Keith E. Hamm, Variation in District-Level Campaign Spending in 
State Legislatures, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 59–80 (Joel A. 
Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief, eds., 1998), at 72–73.  
 55.  POWELL, supra note 2, at 90. 
 56.  Id. at 134–36.  
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Since fundraising is assumed to foster donor influence, the factors 
hypothesized to explain chamber differences in fundraising time 
should also explain chamber differences in influence. Again, the 
correspondence between the model predictions and the results is 
excellent. Seven factors are hypothesized to explain donor influence. 
Six of the seven coefficients are in the right direction (the seventh is 
zero).57 Five of these coefficients are statistically significant.58 The 
consistency of results for factors that explain both fundraising time 
and influence, as well as the observed relationship between 
fundraising time and influence, supports the validity of the influence 
measure as well as the basic premise of the model that relates 
fundraising to donor influence. 
In sum, it is particularly in the professionalized legislatures (often 
found in large states) where features of institutional design 
incentivize fundraising and create donor influence. These legislatures 
tend to have large constituencies, well-compensated members, and 
professionalized leaders. Term-limits, which were adopted in a large 
minority of states, reduce the value of holding legislative office and 
thus are expected to, and do, reduce fundraising time and donor 
influence. Much of their effect is, however, blunted by the ambition 
for other office that term limits induce.59 Members in term-limited 
legislatures are just as interested in political careers as members in 
other legislatures. Since their time in the chamber is limited, they can 
only continue in elective office by running for another position. 
Ambition for other office increases the value of, and hence the time 
devoted to, both fundraising for self and caucus; each type of 
 
 57.  The seventh coefficient measures leader compensation. This variable is highly 
correlated with two of the other independent variables. This correlation combined, with its 
crude measurement, makes it difficult to discern leader compensation’s effect and, thus, will bias 
the coefficient towards zero.  
 58.  POWELL, supra note 2, at 152–57.  
 59.  As one term-limited California legislator explained: 
I don’t think term limits [decrease the importance of money to legislators] at all. And 
if you feel like you’re moving on, it’s just the opposite. And I think I’m a good 
example of that. Given the district that I represent—a low-turnout, minority district—
I don’t have to raise very much money to get reelected. I might get away with raising 
$50,000-100,000, just to be safe, but I don’t need more than that, and even that may be 
overkill. Then, of course, the leadership wants me to raise a little bit more to give to 
the caucus and to give to other members, and you start doing that. But now, I think ‘I 
may have to move on from here. I may have to run statewide or for a regional office, 
or whatever.’ Now, I don’t need to raise $100,000—I need to raise several million. . . . I 
need to start developing my Rolodex now.  
JOHN M. CAREY, RICHARD G. NIEMI, & LYNDA W. POWELL, TERM LIMITS IN THE STATE 
LEGISLATURES 38 (2000). 
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fundraising increases donor influence. Levels of ambition for other 
offices vary greatly among the legislative chambers60 and the effects of 
ambition on fundraising extend well beyond merely reducing the 
influence of term limits. Chamber size also determines the degree to 
which legislatures accommodate the interests of donors—the more 
members, the more fundraising, and the greater the donor influence. 
Finally, studies have consistently found that levels of public 
corruption are lower in states with more highly educated citizens.61 
Donors too are less influential in these states, perhaps because more 
highly educated voters may be more aware of legislator fundraising 
and likelier to conclude that such legislators will be less likely to 
represent their interests. 
In net, these results show that donor influence is measurable and 
varies substantially among the ninety-nine state legislative chambers. 
The difference in the influence measure comparing the chamber with 
the most influence to the least is 1.6 points on a seven-point scale. 
How substantial is a difference of this magnitude? For comparison, 
the chamber-level range of legislator self-placement on the standard 
survey response seven-point liberalism-conservatism scale is 2.3 
points. This range represents an enormous ideological gulf—the most 
liberal chambers are over 75 percent Democratic while the most 
conservative non-southern state is 88 percent Republican. The range 
for donor influence is fully 70 percent of that for ideology.62 This 
comparison suggests that the variation in influence is substantial and 
substantively meaningful. 
 
 
 60. To reinforce just how striking this range is among various chambers:  
In the upper chambers of North and South Dakota, Montana, Tennessee and in the 
unicameral legislature of Nebraska, only 15-20% of members think they are likely to 
run for other office. In other chambers, including both chambers in Louisiana, the 
lower chambers in California and Arkansas, and the upper chambers in Florida and 
Michigan, the percentages are as high as 70-90%. 
POWELL, supra note 2, at 48.  
 61.  See, e.g, James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, The Political Economy of Institutions 
and Corruption in American States, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 341, 358 tbl. 3 (2003); Edward L. 
Glaeser & Raven E. Saks, Corruption in America, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1053, 1055 (2006); Amanda 
E. Maxwell & Richard F. Winters, A Quarter-Century of (Data on) Corruption in the American 
States, (Apr. 15-18, 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest 
Political Science Association) (manuscript at 18) , available at 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~rwinters/AM&RW2004.pdf.  
 62.  POWELL, supra note 2, at 29. 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE RESEARCH 
Campaign finance scholars will find some of these findings about 
the effects of institutions unsurprising, providing reassurance that the 
general model and its assumptions are reasonable. Other findings are 
novel and yield new insights into the incentives that underlie 
fundraising and their consequences. Four general conclusions can be 
drawn from the fine-grained findings. 
First, especially given recent Supreme Court decisions,63 campaign 
finance laws are, at least in the short term, unlikely by themselves to 
effectively restrain the flow of influence-seeking donations into 
politics. Certainly campaign finance laws are important and many 
think them essential.64 Yet, frustratingly, laws often seem to only 
redirect the flow of money into politics without greatly lessening it. 
Further, it is difficult to determine which regulations will most 
effectively mitigate the influence of campaign donors. For example, 
clean election laws required candidates who accepted public funds to 
largely forego private fundraising for their election campaigns.65 These 
laws were adopted to reduce the influence of big donors both in 
campaigns and in the legislative process.66 Such laws were in effect in 
two states at the time of my survey.67 Of course, these clean election 
laws virtually eliminated the time participating legislators spent 
fundraising for their own campaigns, but, as expected from the model, 
these participating legislators spent part of the time saved on 
additional fundraising for their caucus. Those legislators’ total 
fundraising time was somewhat reduced, but not by as much as 
reformers anticipated. 
 
 
 63.  See three recent decisions, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); and FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), 
each of which weakened existing campaign finance regulations. 
 64.  See, e.g., Montana’s Opposition to the Application of a Stay of the Montana’s Supreme 
Court’s Decision Pending Certiorari, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 
(2012) (per curiam) (No. 11-A762), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/11A762-AG-response-2-15-12.pdf. Attorney General Bullock argued 
that the Supreme Court was being asked to “invalidate Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act—an 
Act that has safeguarded the republican form of government in Montana for a century from the 
scourge of political corruption.” Id. at 1. 
 65.  E.g., Neil Maholtra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition: 
Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 8 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 263, 263 (2008) (citing clean election 
laws that allow “candidates to use taxpayer dollars to fund their campaigns in exchange for 
accepting spending limits and forgoing private contributions”). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  The two states were Maine and Arizona. Id. at 266–67.  
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Second, the effectiveness of campaign finance laws can be 
conditional on features of institutional design and politics. Trying to 
determine the extent to which a campaign financial regulation 
“bites”—that is, the extent to which it reduces donations—is thus 
complex and can vary from state to state, from lower to upper 
chamber, and over time. Continuing the clean election laws example, 
the extent to which clean election laws reduce total fundraising 
should be, based on the model, dependent upon the value of caucus 
fundraising. 
Chambers with professionalized leadership structures were 
particularly effective in incentivizing members to fundraise for their 
caucus. And caucus fundraising was more rewarding when the 
majority party had a thin margin of control—that is, when the next 
election could potentially flip chamber control. Thus, clean election 
laws should be most effective in reducing total fundraising time when 
caucus fundraising is least rewarding, namely in chambers with lop-
sided margins of party control accompanied by weak leadership 
structures. 
Third, both of the two prior points provide an example that 
illustrates why it is difficult and problematic to score states on the 
stringency of their campaign finance laws. More generally, we do not 
know the relative impact of the specifics of campaign finance 
regulations (those related to limits, disclosure and public funding) on 
reducing fundraising time. Further, the effectiveness of any one 
provision, for example, limits on fundraisers held during the 
legislative session, may also be dependent on the specifics of other 
provisions of the law. Similarly, effectiveness may also depend on 
aspects of chamber politics and features of institutional design, such 
as those described in the preceding paragraph. 
Fourth, some observers may be tempted to infer state differences 
in donor influence by comparing the average amount of money an 
incumbent raises in one state to the average raised in another. These 
comparisons can be misleading. Differences in average fundraising 
time do correspond to differences in chamber levels of donor 
influence. The amount of money a legislator raises is equal to the 
product of the time she spends fundraising and her rate of return on 
her time (the amount she raises per unit of fundraising time). Within a 
chamber, differences in rates of return are related to differences in the 
influence individual members (and potentially their donors) have 
over the policy agenda. It makes sense for a donor to spend more 
POWELL 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2014  4:29 PM 
92 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9:1 
money to attend the fundraiser of a committee chair than that of a 
freshman legislator. 
However, differences among chambers in average rates of return 
are, in my analysis, unrelated to differences in donor influence. Why is 
there no relationship at this macro (chamber) level while there is at 
the micro (member) level? Chamber rates of return are largely 
dependent on the size of a state’s economy (measured by its gross 
state product and the number of registered lobbyists) and also on the 
absence of contribution limits and chamber size.68 These variables, 
along with a control for tied chambers, explain 86 percent of the 
variance in chamber-level rates of return. One way to think about 
these factors is that they determine the size of a donation needed to 
create a relationship or a sense of obligation between a donor and a 
legislator. The amount that “significant” donors give in one state may 
be much larger than the amount “significant” donors contribute in 
another state. Thus chamber fundraising averages, which depend not 
just on fundraising time, but also on these rates of return, may not 
correspond that closely to levels of donor influence. 
Currently, reformers focus on campaign finance laws as the way to 
reduce the influence of money in politics. While these laws may help 
limit the influence of contributions, they do not address the root of 
the problem—the institutional features of legislatures that incentivize 
fundraising. Many legislators themselves complain about the time and 
obligations linked to financing expensive campaigns. If we wish to 
reduce the pressures that members in some chambers face to raise 
money, we need to consider institutional reforms to change 
fundraising incentives. Because much of the literature on campaign 
finance has focused only on Congress, little attention has been 
devoted to understanding how features of institutional design and 
politics structure fundraising incentives and determine levels of 
influence in legislatures. These factors explain much of the difference 
in fundraising effort and in donor influence, and these features of 
institutional design may be legally more modifiable and effective in 
reducing the influence of money than reforms implemented through 
campaign finance regulations. 
 
 
 68.  Rates of return are greater in states with larger economies and no limits on donation 
size, and they are lesser in larger chambers. POWELL, supra note 2, at 134–35. 
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V.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
LOBBYING 
In addition to campaign contributions, lobbying is another way to 
use financial resources to influence legislative outcomes. If giving and 
lobbying are relatively unrelated activities, the effects of each on 
policy could be studied separately. But if they are linked, neither can 
be studied in isolation from the other. There are two different theories 
of lobbying. Some argue that lobbying access is largely contingent on 
campaign donations and furthers donors’ goals.69 Others contend that 
legislators can be informed about policy issues by lobbyists without 
being significantly influenced.70 In this latter view, the legislators most 
dependent on lobbyists are those who gain the most value from the 
information lobbyists provide. 
The survey of legislators I analyzed provided an opportunity for a 
critical test of these two opposing theories of lobbying. Each makes 
different predictions about which legislators should rely more on 
lobbyists. The “access” model predicts that the more time a member 
devotes to fundraising, and the greater his relative rate of return on 
his fundraising time,71 the more he will rely on lobbyists for 
information. The informational model predicts that members at an 
informational disadvantage, such as new members, members in larger 
chambers, members in chambers with greater turnover in office, and 
members interested in greater numbers of issue, will be more reliant 
on lobbyists. In the survey, each legislator was asked how important 
lobbyists were to him as a source of information, and this allowed me 
to test the two views of lobbying against each other.72 My results 
 
 69.  See, e.g., Clyde Wilcox, The Dynamics of Lobbying the Hill, in THE INTEREST GROUP 
CONNECTION: ELECTIONEERING, LOBBYING, AND POLICYMAKING IN WASHINGTON 90 (Paul 
S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, Clyde Wilcox, eds., 1998) (“There are a variety of strategies to 
gain [lobbying] access. One of the most common is to contribute to the campaign of a member . 
. . . There is considerable evidence that campaign contributions do help groups gain access to 
the member.”).  
 70.  For formal models of this argument see David Austen-Smith, Information and 
Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 799 (1993), and Randall L. 
Calvert, The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice, 47 J. 
POL. 530 (1985). Hall & Deardorff, supra note 34, come close to this argument as well. 
 71.  A member’s rate of return is the amount contributed by others to his campaign divided 
by the amount of time he reports fundraising. His relative rate of return is his rate of return 
divided by the average rate of return in his chamber. 
 72.  Legislators were asked, “As you consider the various sources of information available 
to you as a legislator how important are each of the following?” Lobbyists were one of the 
sources asked about in a list of nine sources. Respondents were provided with a five-point scale. 
One endpoint was labeled “Not Important At All” and the other “Very Important.” See 
POWELL, supra note 2, at 185–86.  
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cleanly and strongly support the “access” view of lobbying. None of 
the coefficients that test the informational view are statistically 
significant and several are in the wrong direction. The three 
coefficients for the variables that test the “access” view of lobbying 
are each statistically and substantively significant and, as expected, 
time spent fundraising for self and for caucus have equal effect on the 
degree to which members rely on lobbyists. 
These findings suggest a mechanism of effect for contributions 
through lobbying, although they do not preclude other pathways of 
donor influence. Further, the linkage between lobbying and 
contributing means that those of us who study campaign finance must 
also take account of lobbying activity to more fully understand the 
complex relationships that constitute influence. 
VI.  CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICY REPRESENTATION 
Scholars have also considered whether our evolving campaign 
finance system has exacerbated the relationship between “affluence” 
and “influence” in our political system.73 Larry Bartels, for example, 
observed that “the political process has evolved in ways that seem 
likely to reinforce the advantages of wealth. Political campaigns have 
become dramatically more expensive since the 1950s, increasing the 
reliance of elected officials on people who can afford to help finance 
their bids for reelection.”74 
Thus far, I have only considered the effects of contributions in the 
legislative process—that is, on members in office. However, 
contributions may also influence who attains office by affecting who 
runs for office and which candidates win primaries and general 
elections. Elections determine the party, ideologies, and issue 
orientations of legislative officeholders, and, in a democratic system, 
are expected to create representative institutions. In evaluating how 
well we achieve the normative ideal of representation, it is important 
to consider the effects of money in both the electoral and legislative 
processes. 
Contributions have legislative influence because they are valuable 
electoral resources. Candidates raise funds to spend on their own 
 
 73.  E.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012). 
 74.  LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
NEW GILDED AGE 2 (2008). 
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campaigns, and many legislators also raise money that they re-gift to 
other candidates in order to advance their own legislative careers. 
Many of the individual and PAC donors who contribute to legislative 
incumbents give to members who sit on committees that oversee their 
legislative interests.75 They give to obtain or maintain policies that 
favor their concerns. In contrast to these “materially” motivated 
donors, others give to advance a broad issue or ideological agenda. 
These “purposive” donors are more likely to give to challengers, open 
seat candidates, and to the small fraction of incumbents up for 
reelection in competitive races.76 They focus on these particular types 
of candidates and elections in order to maintain or alter the partisan 
and ideological composition of our legislatures. Finally, some 
“solidary” donors have neither politically purposive nor material 
motivations. Often these solidary donors are mobilized by their 
politically motivated family, friends, or business associates who can 
gain “credit” with candidates for the funds they raise from others. 
Thus, a portion of the funds given by these solidary donors will serve 
to advance the material or purposive goals of fundraising 
intermediaries. 
Donors make choices about how to allocate their funds to best 
achieve their goals. Some candidates are more attractive to 
ideological or partisan purposive donors while others are more 
appealing to materially minded contributors.77 Campaign finance laws, 
by determining who may give and how much they may give, can 
potentially advantage candidates who appeal to one type of donor 
rather than another. For example, laws that impose limits on 
donations from corporations or unions may reduce the inflow of 
campaign dollars from one type of donor, material in this example, 
thus incidentally advantaging candidates who raise money primarily 
from purposive donors. This might result in more extreme ideological 
candidates, who hold greater appeal to purposive donors, gaining at 
the expense of rent-seeking incumbents, who receive more funds from 
materially oriented contributors. 
 
 75.  GRIER & MUNGER, supra note 28, at 38. 
 76.  For more detailed discussions of donor motives, see CLIFFORD W. BROWN JR., LYNDA 
W. POWELL, & CLYDE WILCOX, SERIOUS MONEY: FUNDRAISING AND CONTRIBUTING IN 
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION CAMPAIGNS (1995), and PETER L. FRANCIA, JOHN C. GREEN, 
PAUL S. HERRNSON, LYNDA W. POWELL, & CLYDE WILCOX, THE FINANCIERS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2003). 
 77.  Of course, realistically, contributors have a mix of purposive, material, and solidary 
motives and their contribution decisions will reflect their varied goals.  
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By altering the extent to which different types of donors put 
money into politics, campaign finance rules can affect who chooses to 
run for office, their electoral prospects, and thus the ideologies and 
legislative priorities of candidates before they even win election. And 
the sheer volume of money itself, which also is dependent on 
regulatory decisions and constitutional constraints, gives greater 
“voice” and influence to donors, potentially resulting in greater 
representation for donors at the expense of other citizens. 
Studies find, not surprisingly, that wealthy individuals participate 
more in politics than those with less wealth,78 and this inequality of 
participation is greatest for the financial contributions that candidates 
depend upon to attain office.79 This participation leads to greater 
representation for the wealthy. Martin Gilens80 and Larry Bartles81 
showed that elected officials respond more to the preferences of 
wealthy Americans than to those of other citizens. By examining the 
electoral policy positions of each major party’s candidates, Elizabeth 
Rigby and Gerald Wright, found that unequal responsiveness begins 
early in the policy process.82 
Gilens determined that the degree of representational distortion 
in policy outcomes related to wealth varies by issue area.83 On most 
issues, the wealthy are advantaged, but for four specific social welfare 
policies “there is no evidence that the middle class or the poor lose 
out when their views diverge from those of the well-off.”84 Stuart 
Soroka and Christopher Wlezien further caution that inequality of 
representation will be limited if policy preferences vary little by 
income group.85 They find that spending preferences on eight policy 
 
 78.  E.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA, & HENRY E. BRADY, THE 
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 122–23 (2012) (“[W]ith the single exception of attending a protest, 
political activity rises with socio-economic status.”); see also VERBA ET AL., supra note 11, at 
189. 
 79.  SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 124–25 fig. 5.2.  
   80.  GILENS, supra note 73, at 76 (“Turning next to the differences in policy responsiveness 
for respondents at different income levels, we find, as expected, that higher-income 
respondents’ views are more strongly related to government policy.”). 
 81.  BARTELS, supra note 74, at 257–74. 
 82.  Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor 
in the American States, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 552, 552–53 (2013).  
 83.  GILENS, supra note 73, at 122. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Stuart N. Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in 
Representation, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 319, 324 (2008). 
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domains generally differ modestly by income tertiles.86 
In each of these studies the top wealth group is defined as the top 
third to top tenth of the general population. Economists have recently 
drawn attention to a much smaller segment of Americans, the top one 
percent.87 This group has shown the greatest gains in wealth in recent 
years. These individuals are too rare to study using general population 
surveys. Benjamin Page, Larry Bartels, and Jason Seawright are 
involved in a collaborative effort to survey this top one percent of the 
wealthiest Americans.88 They report on a preliminary study conducted 
in Chicago. In contrast to the top percentile of wealth in the Soroka 
and Wlezian study, the top one percent in the Page et al. study 
differed markedly from the average public on a number of spending 
priorities. The top one percent are especially conservative and results 
suggest the top one-tenth of one percent are yet more conservative, 
differing substantially from the general public.89 
Scholars have identified the extensive political participation of the 
wealthy, in particular their campaign contributions, as a possible 
causal mechanism to explain the representational distortions that 
favor them.90 The top one percent are especially notable in terms of 
their contribution activity. Page, Bartels, and Seawright found that the 
top one percent participate extensively in politics—68 percent of their 
respondents made a contribution (averaging $4,633) and 21 percent 
had solicited or bundled contributions.91 Forty percent had contacted 
at least one of their United States Senators and 37 percent had 
contacted their House member. Almost half of these contacts focused 
on a “narrow issue of economic self-interest.”92 
There is also data indicating that although the wealthy are a small 
fraction of all donors, their donations constitute a large fraction of 
political contributions. Pew Research Center found that 16 percent of 
Americans reported making a political contribution in the year 
preceding their 2012 survey, a finding similar to the eighteen percent 
 
 86.  Id. at 322–23 figs. 2 & 3. 
 87.  See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED 
SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2013). 
 88.  Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy 
Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013).  
 89.  Id. at 64–65. 
 90.  See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note 74, at 275–80; GILENS, supra note 73, at 239. 
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reporting giving in 2008.93 Thus, the 68 percent of the top one percent 
constitute a small fraction of donors. However, the likelihood of 
making a large enough contribution to require public disclosure, the 
number of contributions, and the size of a contribution are all 
increasing functions of income.94 Therefore, a relatively small number 
of quite wealthy individuals give a large fraction of the total dollars 
donated in politics. Indeed, estimates of the fraction the top one 
percent of the one percent of donors (31,385 individuals) contributed 
in the 2012 election range from 28 percent to over 40 percent of all 
disclosed contributions.95 
Thus it is not surprising that campaign contributions are a causal 
mechanism scholars frequently point to in order to explain the policy 
influence of wealthy Americans. Bartels, for example, rejects socio-
economically related differences in voting turnout, political 
knowledge, and contacting elected officials as explanations for the 
representational disparities he finds.96 Instead he states, “[a] tempting 
alternative hypothesis is that the disproportional influence of affluent 
constituents reflects their disproportional propensity to contribute 
money to political campaigns.”97 His data do not provide the needed 
information to test this explanation, but he cites the similarity 
between the giving and wealth numbers provided by Sidney Verba, 
Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady’s study of participatory 
inequality,98 and his own aggregate results as consistent with a 
contribution explanation. Gilens similarly states, “[p]olitical 
donations, then, but not voting or volunteering, resembles the pattern 
of representational inequality we saw in earlier chapters.”99 
 
 
 
 93.  AARON SMITH & PEW RESEARCH CENTER, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE: PART I: ONLINE AND OFFLINE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICA 8 (2013), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/oldmedia//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_CivicEngagementintheDigit
alAge.pdf. 
 94.  FRANCIA ET AL., supra note 76, at 110–11. 
 95. Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, & Howard Rosenthal, Why Hasn’t 
Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality? 27 J. Econ. Persp. 103, 112 fig. 5 (2013) (estimating the 
one percent’s share of the total disclosed campaign contributions in 2012 was over 40 percent); 
Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (June 24, 
2013, 9:00 AM) (estimating that the top one percent donated 28 percent of the total disclosed 
contributions in 2012), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/. 
 96.  BARTELS, supra note 74, at 275–80. 
 97.  Id. at 280.  
 98.  VERBA ET AL., supra note 11. 
 99.  GILENS, supra note 73, at 239.  
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Although these studies make a strong argument for the 
relationship between political contributions and economic inequality 
of representation, we lack studies that make the exact causal linkages 
needed for affirmation. If political contributions are part of the causal 
explanation for the outsized influence of the wealthy, how might 
campaign finance regulations mitigate this representational 
distortion? 
Some argue that broader adoption of matching programs for small 
donors would reduce politicians’ dependence on large donors and 
result in better representation for citizens.100 In these programs public 
funds match the contributions of small donors to increase the 
importance of small contributors in the donor pool. Multiple 
matching programs are particularly effective at leveraging the power 
of small donors. The New York City program matches the first $175 of 
each eligible contribution at a six-to-one ratio, providing a six-times 
multiplier for small donations.101 The argument for matching 
contribution programs for small donors rests on the reasonable 
supposition that reducing the fraction of money from big givers will 
diminish their influence, but as yet, we have no empirical evidence on 
the representational effects of these laws. 
Instead of enhancing the contributions of small donors, others 
favor constraining donations from wealthy actors, such as 
corporations and unions. These choices can advantage or 
disadvantage different types of donors. For example, laws that 
constrain rent-seeking material donors should theoretically advantage 
purposive ideological donors and the more extreme candidates they 
 
 100. Campaign Finance for the Empire State Testimonials, NY LEAD, 
http://nylead.org/about-us/testimonials/, (last visited July 21, 2014) (recounting testimonials of: 
(1) Dennis Mehiel, Chairman and CEO of U.S. Corrugated and Battery Park City, noting “[a] 
system of small donor matching funds is a good answer. It will encourage business growth, help 
constituents hold candidates and officials accountable and ensure fair legislation in Albany;” (2) 
Sherwood Boehlert, former Congressman from New York’s 23rd District, opining that 
“[l]awmakers would be allowed to focus on what they came to Albany to do—serve the broad 
public interest and make decisions that are in the best interests of the people;” (3) Jane 
Sherburne, General Counsel, BNY Mellon, commenting that, “[t]his effort is about achieving 
reforms that ensure that the interests of our elected leaders are aligned with the people they 
represent;” and (4) Dick Dadey, Executive Director of Citizens Union, saying, “[w]ith a public 
matching system that puts the public interest’s voice on a more level-playing field, state 
government will become more responsive and accountable”). 
 101.  For a description of the New York City matching funds program, see NEW YORK CITY 
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., Overview of Matching Funds Program, http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates 
/candidates/publicmatchingfunds.aspx, (last visited July 21, 2014). 
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support. Michael Barber found evidence consistent with this effect.102 
Lower limits on contributions from PACs resulted in more 
ideologically extreme state legislators, as did higher rather than lower 
limits on individual donors. Altering the balance between purposive 
and material donors could affect the nature of any representational 
distortion as well—social issues, for example, should be more salient 
to purposive donors than to material givers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Measuring the influence of contributions on roll call votes has 
proven difficult, if not impossible. More importantly, donor influence 
is likely to occur earlier in the legislative process, especially in 
committees, where bills are written, marked up, and often simply 
killed quietly. Ideally, we want a measure that captures the full 
influence of donors in the legislative process, including the actions 
that do not leave a data trail. Elite surveys are often used to construct 
such comprehensive measures. I develop a theory that links 
legislators’ campaign fundraising to the policy choices they make in 
office. This theory allows me to derive a lengthy list of predictions 
about how politics and institutions affect the time each member 
spends on fundraising for herself and on fundraising for her caucus 
and on donor influence in the member’s chamber. The consistency 
and accuracy of the predictions for fundraising times and influence 
supports the validity of the survey measure of influence. 
The bottom line is that institutions matter greatly in determining 
levels of donor influence in chambers. Along with politics, institutions 
establish the incentives that fuel fundraising. They produce wide 
variation in donor influence—donors have considerable influence in 
some chambers and little in others. Institutional effects are also 
nuanced and complex. Term limits, for example, by reducing the value 
of holding office, diminish fundraising and influence. But in term-
limited legislatures members can only continue their elective careers 
by running for other offices. Ambition for other office increases 
fundraising and hence donor influence. These two effects of term 
limits largely cancel each other out, perhaps slightly decreasing 
fundraising and influence. 
 
 102.  Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of 
State Legislatures 4 (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/ 
51841c73e4b04fc5ce6e8f15/t/52275a92e4b03f583b4b4047/1378310802196/Limits.pdf  
(unpublished manuscript).  
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Campaign finance laws are advocated to reduce donor influence. 
Their effects, however, will be contingent on the institutional systems 
in which they are situated. Institutions and laws cannot be studied in 
isolation. They are complex, interrelated, and evolving systems that 
shape both donor and legislator behaviors. We constantly face new 
challenges to understand these phenomena. Increases in independent 
expenditures, for example, raise vital new questions. Do donors who 
make independent expenditures gain the same influence in the 
legislative process as those who contribute to political campaigns? Or, 
as the Supreme Court has determined,103 does their separation from a 
candidate’s campaign eliminate any “corrupting” influence? Further, 
are those who raise more from independent expenditures, often 
argued to be ideologically motivated, less willing to engage in 
legislative bipartisanship, and thus more firmly polarized in their 
positions? 
 
 
 
 103.  See Citizens United v. FEC., 588 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (“The absence of 
prearrangement and coordination of an [independent] expenditure with the candidate or his 
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the 
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the 
candidate.” (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976))). 
